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ANALYZING THE DYNAMICS OF 
RELATIVE PRICES ON A MARKET WITH 
SPECULATIVE AND NON-SPECULATIVE






The paper deals with an evolutionary model focused on the relation between the 
behavior of prices and the structure of the population of economic agents. The model 
allows for identification of the short-term behavior of prices and the dynamics of the 
population of economic agents in the context of seven scenarios. These scenarios are 
a combination of four key factors: market regulations, the maturity of the market; the 
intervention of the state on the market supply side and the modifications of the 
incentives to speculate and not-speculate. The main findings of the simulation of the 
scenarios are: i) The presence of speculators leave long lasting effects which do not 
die out with the decrease in the number of speculators; ii) In the presence of high 
speculations the intervention of the state can act as an anchor to the market helping to 
lower the prices; iii) The market forces have a more lasting effect than the state 
regulation mechanisms. 
Keywords: relative prices, speculative and non-speculative agents, evolutionary 
model
JEL Classification: C15, C73, E37
1. Introduction 
The evolutionary modeling offers powerful instruments to capture the dynamics of a 
system with non-linear interactions between the components. These models are able 
to capture the short-term evolution of relative prices which exhibit high volatility. This 
is the case of the prices of economic agents. In this case, the volatility is intrinsic to 
the phenomenon, meaning it is governed by volatile endogenous factors.
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The objective of the paper is to analyze the behavior of prices and the dynamics of the 
population of economic agents in different market conditions defined by the 
combination of four key factors: market regulations, the maturity of the market; the 
intervention of the State on the market supply side and the modifications of the 
incentives to speculate and not to speculate.
The paper is based on a computer simulation. As an application, the simulation 
focuses on the housing market. The characteristics of this market namely the 
presence of speculative and non-speculative agents and the high volatility of prices 
make it a good subject for the simulation.
There are numerous approaches in modeling the housing market, which can be 
classified into two categories.
The first category analyzes the historical data and can be generically defined as 
econometric approach. For example, Case and Shiller (1989), Abraham and 
Hendershott (1993) analyzed the housing price series from the perspective of serial 
correlation. Abraham and Hendershott (1996), Capozza and Seguin (1996), Malpezzi 
(1999) analyzed the housing price series from the perspective of mean reversion. 
Other studies focused on more complex techniques. Kauko (2003), Kershaw and 
Rossini (1999), Rossini (1997) used neural networks and value tree approaches to 
analyze and forecast the housing price data. Carvalho (2003) used spatial analysis to 
identify the impact of speculation behavior on the housing market prices. 
 The second category is based on simulations. For example, Goldstein (2003) used a 
cellular automata model to analyze the housing growth pattern. Amri and Bossomaier 
(2003) used an agent-based model to simulate the behavior of sellers and buyers on 
the housing market prices. Bossomaier, Amri and Thompson (2005) defined fuzzy 
variables and fuzzy rules to model the interactions of demand and offer on the 
housing market.
The current paper is based on an evolutionary modeling framework (see Nelson and 
Winter, 1982; Winter, 1984; Winter, Kaniovski and Dosi, 1997, 2000) and uses an 
evolutionary game theory approach (see Maynard Smith and Price, 1973; Maynard 
Smith, 1982). The behavior of agents is regulated by a pay-off matrix similar to the 
one used by (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973). The transition of the agent population 
from one state to the other is based on dynamic multiplayer proposed by Taylor and 
Jonker (1978). The dynamics of the agent population is similar with the one proposed 
by Carpenter (2002), in which agents in each period adopt a strategy with probability 
equal to the strategy’s relative success. Our modeling approach of the housing market 
is similar to Amri and Bossomaier (2003) in the sense that it uses an agent-based 
computer simulation. In both cases, the dynamics of prices and the evolution of the 
population of economic agents are analyzed using scenarios that define market 
conditions and the speculative and non-speculative behavior of these agents.
The novelty of the paper is represented by the analysis of the effectiveness of different 
combinations of four key factors in combating the speculative behaviors on the 
housing market. These factors are: market regulations, the maturity of the market; the 
intervention of the State on the market supply side and the modifications of the 
incentives to speculate and not to speculate. This way we want to understand which of 
the conditions is more effective in diminishing the effects of the speculative behaviors Institute of Economic Forecasting
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on the market, and how these conditions influence each other.
The next section will present the theory behind the modeling strategy. The focus is on 
the evolutionary models and the evolutionary game theory. The third section presents 
the model developed. It focuses on presenting the blocks of the model, namely the 
price analysis block and the economic agents block. The fourth section presents the 
output of the model computer simulation. The final section presents the conclusions. 
2. Evolutionary modeling approach  
Evolutionary models, originated in biology, are better equipped to analyze complex 
systems. Economic modeling approaches have been focused, for a long time, on the 
idea of equilibrium and did not use the insights of biology. It was not until Winter and 
Nelson (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Winter, 1984) that a rigorous use of such insights 
came about. Later developments continued the Schumpeterian tradition of the original 
approach (see Jonard and Yildizoglu, 1998) but also included new technical novelties; 
for example, the inclusion of a stochastic system regulating the arrival of new firms or 
economic agents on the market (see Winter, Kaniovski and Dosi, 1997, 2000). 
The modeling strategy in this paper is based on the evolutionary model framework. 
The characteristic of the market and the behavior of the economic agents are 
governed by dynamic processes. Prices are changing following the rules of evolution, 
such as natural selection, as in the case of Price’s equation (Price 1970), or statistical 
rules, as in the case of our paper. The structure of the population of economic agents 
is changing, reflecting different rules of fitness. In the case of the paper, the fitness is 
reflected by the pay-off matrix (Maynard Smith and Price 1973). The dynamics of the 
population is based on an evolutionary game theory approach (see R.A. Fisher, 1930; 
Lewontin, 1961; Maynard Smith, 1972). 
The model development focuses on the analysis of the transition of the economic 
agents’ population from one state to another, and on the modifications of its key 
characteristics. It is based on the approach of Maynard, Smith and Price (1973). The 
novelty of this approach comes from the explicit definition of the transition rule of the 
population from a state to another state. This allows for the explicit identification of the 
modifications in the population following one strategy or the other.
The paper uses as a rule of transition the dynamic multiplayer proposed by Taylor and 
Jonker (1978). The percentage of population following a strategy at a moment t+1 is a 
function of the number of members following that strategy at the moment t, the 
benefits of adopting that strategy at moment t, and the aggregated benefits of 
following any of the strategies. This approach allows for the correlation between the 
changes in the population of speculative and non-speculative agents and the pay-off 
matrix.
3. Modeling the dynamics of relative prices using 
an evolutionary model 
The model developed in this paper is based on the evolutionary approach. 
Consequently, it has two main theoretical components, an evolutionary model  Analyzing the Dynamics of Relative Prices on a Market 
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component and an evolutionary game component. The models allows for modeling 
the short and medium time dynamics of relative prices. This is firstly done by 
constructing a price block. The dynamics of relative prices is modeled on a market 
with speculative and non-speculative agents. Consequently, a second block is added 
to the model, namely the economic agents block. We want to allow for the presence of 
shocks in the economy; consequently, a function that models the reaction of the 
economic actors to different economic shocks was added.
By speculative agents we mean the agents characterized by a high variation of their 
prices as against the mean of the market and to the mean of the recorded prices of 
those agents. Non-speculative agents are the agents that register low variation of 
prices comparative to the mean of the market and to the mean of the recorded prices 
of those agents.
The economic agents block 
The behavior of economic agents is modeled by using the evolutionary game theory 
approach. The pay-off matrix is a prisoner’s dilemma type. The model is largely used 
in analyzing social decisions due to its characteristics, one important characteristic 
from this point of view being that it can generate a suboptimal Nash equilibrium (see 
Nash, 1950). In this kind of game the value of pay-offs and the type of strategies 
adopted are fundamental for the evolution of the game.
Figure 1 
The pay-off matrix used in the economic agent block  
NS                    S 
NS       BNS BNS             BNS BS
S           BNS BS              BS BS
where: NS is the non-speculative strategy and S is the speculative strategy, BNS is the 
benefit from following strategy NS and BS is the benefit from following strategy S.
We are going to model the changes in the population of agents using the following 
relations.  
F(NS) = PNSǻF(NS,NS)+PS ǻF(NS,S) (1) 
F(S) = PNSǻF(S,NS)+PSǻF(S,S) (2) 
F  = PNSF(NS)+PS F(S)                            (3) 
where: ǻF(µ,ı) represents the benefits of a member of the population adopting 
strategy µ when another member is adopting strategy ı, F(ı) represents the total 
benefit of a member adopting strategy ı, F0 represents the initial benefit, µ represents 
the mutant strategy, Ps is the percent of population adopting strategy S and PNS the 
percent of population adopting strategy NS.
The transition from a state to another state is modeled using a dynamic multiplier. 
P’NS–PNS = (PNS(F(NS)-F)) /  F (4) 
P’S–PS = (PS(F(S)-F)) /  F (5) 
where: Prepresents the population at moment t and P’ the population at moment t +1. Institute of Economic Forecasting
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Equations (4) and (5) allow for the identification of the modifications in the percent of 
the population adopting one or another strategy. In other words, the relations model 
the number of agents who are cooperative or non-cooperative in each period.
The model allows for the presence of shocks in the economy. The value of the shock 
is a percent of the aggregate benefits of the economic agents. The shocks are 
introduced using a step function. The algorithm is: 
If  PNC/ P >m then 
P’NS–PNS = (PNS(F(NS)-F)) /  F +F/n    (6)     
P’S–PS = (PS(F(S)-F)) /  F –F/n (7) 
else
P’NS–PNS = (PNS(F(NS)-F)) /  F 
P’S–PS = (PS(F(S)-F)) /  F 
where: the value for m is decided by experts given the economic environment and n is 
a random generated number between 0 and 1.
The value of m allows for the modeling of the critical point at which the number of 
speculative agents becomes to grate and supplementary regulations of the market 
become necessary.
The price block
We define an initial state of the market in which we have a number of price clusters 
and the economic agents are speculative and non-speculative.
In the case of the non-speculative agents, the price in period t+1 will be a function of 
their prices in the period t and the average price on the market at the same period t.
The prices of the non-speculative agents will converge to the average price on the 
market. The price is modeled by using the following relation: 
Pai = Pai + Į*Pmean (8)
where: Pai is the price of the ai non-speculative agent, Pmean is the average price on 
the market, and Į is a number between (0, 1) which models the tendency of the price 
of the non-speculative agent to converge to an average price on the market.
In the case of the speculative agents, the price in period t+1 will be a function of their 
prices in period t and the difference between the mean price on the market and the 
maximum price, both at moment t. The prices of the speculative agents will converge 
to the maximal value. The price is modeled using the following relation: 
Paj = Paj + Į*Pmax  (9)
where: Paj is the price of the aj speculative agent, Pmax is the maximum price on the 
market, and Į  is a number between (0 1) which models the tendency of the price of 
the speculative agent converge to a maximum price on the market.
The selection of the type of agent is done by using a random function. If the number of 
one type of agents is growing then the probability to select this type of agents is 
higher. As a consequence, the dynamics of prices on the market will be influenced by 
the dynamics of the populations of agents. In the simulation, we worked with 50 
speculative and non-speculative agents. The procedure is as following: i) we generate 
a random number y between 1 and 50 and we define x=int(y), thus x is the integer  Analyzing the Dynamics of Relative Prices on a Market 
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part of y; ii) we have a set S composed of 50 speculative and non-speculative agents; 
iii) we define a bijective function: 
^ `








50 .. 3 , 2 , 1
   (10)                                       
where: 50 ..... 1 50 1     x x , 50 ..... 1 50 1     a a
Initially, on the market we have a population of agents and one of prices. Using the 
first block, we make the transition of the population of agents from moment t to 
moment t+1. Using the second block, we link the population of agents to the 
population of prices and make the transition of the prices on the market from moment t 
to moment t+1.  In Table 1, we present synthetically the two blocks of the model and 
their roles. 
Table 1 
Synthesis of the model’s blocks 
Blocks Objective  Instruments 
B1  1) Models the 
characteristics of the 
population of agents at 
moment t
2) Models the transition of 
the population from 
moment t to t+1 
1) Uses a prisoner’s dilemma type pay-off matrix
2) Uses a dynamic multiplier to model the 
transition of the population from a state to 
another state, see relations (4) and (5) 
3) Uses function that allows for modeling the 
effects of economic shocks on the pay-off 
matrix, consequently on the strategy adopted 
by the economic agents, see relations (6) and 
(7).
B2  1) Models the non-linear 
evolution of prices on 
short and medium term 
2) Connects the dynamics 
of prices with the 
dynamics of economic 
agents.
1) Uses a function to analyze the  dynamics of 
prices see relations (8) and (9) 
2) Uses a function to select the type of economic 
agents and to connect the dynamics of prices 
with the dynamics of the population of agents, 
see relation (10) 
4. The results of the model computer simulation
The role of the application is to underline the characteristics of the models and to 
illustrate the behavior of prices on short and medium term and the behavior of the 
population of agents. Hypothetical data will be used. This does not have a negative 
impact on the results taking into account that our objective is not to forecast the 
evolution of some prices on the market, but to illustrate the mechanism that explains 
the non-linear behavior of prices on the market. We assume three clusters of prices 
which follow a normal distribution and we model the mean of that distribution. Let us 
take the price of an apartment with two bathrooms in Bucharest, in 2009 and consider 
three clusters of prices with the mean price of 45, 60 and 78 thousand euro.Institute of Economic Forecasting
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We want to analyze the following: i) the impact of market regulations on prices; ii) the 
impact of the maturity of the market on prices; iii) the impact of the intervention of the 
State on the market supply side on prices; iv) the impact of the modifications of the 
incentives to speculate and not-speculate on prices.
To understand the interplay between various characteristics of the market we are 
going to present a synthetic table underling the characteristics and how they appear in 
the scenarios.
Table 2
Synthetic presentation of the scenarios 
  S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 
Efficient market mechanism  no  yes  no  yes  no  no  no 
Efficient  regulations  no  no  yes yes yes  no  yes 
The intervention of the State in the 
market supply side
no no no no no  yes  yes 
Incentives not to speculate on the 
market
no  no  no  no yes no yes 
All the characteristics presented above were modeled in a simulation using Visual 
Basic. By efficient market mechanism, we refer to a market where the interplay of 
demand and supply does not allow for consistent increases in prices, there are market 
forces in play that tend to generate equilibrium on the market. We modeled this by 
putting a smaller weight on the maximum prices and, at the same time, by the action 
of the non-speculative agents who put a significant pressure on prices on the market 
(see relations 8 and 9, the value of Į is higher in 8 and lower in 9 in comparison with 
the case of the lack of efficient market mechanisms)
By efficient regulation, we mean that the institutions monitor the evolution of the 
market and take measures when the percentage of speculative agents becomes too 
high. We model this by using a random function for selecting the moment when the 
regulations are active and by selecting the percentage of speculative actors allowed 
(see relations 6 and 7). 
By intervention of the state in the market supply side we mean, for example, the case 
of ANL (Housing National Agency) constructions. We model this by choosing one of 
the clusters to represent the prices of the State buildings, and we consider those 
prices unchanged so as to act as an anchor.
By incentive not to speculate we refer to all the characteristics of the market and of the 
regulations that make the non-speculative behavior less attractive. We model this by 
using a prisoner dilemma type of pay-off matrix, and by changing the incentives for 
choosing a strategy that indicates speculation (in our case, speculate-speculate and 
speculate-not speculate).
We simulated the evolution of prices on the market for 45 periods. The population of 
economic agents transits from one state to another once three periods. The periods 
can be seen as days, weeks, months, years. We choose the transit state of three 
periods having in mind the length of a month. The idea is that reliable economic  Analyzing the Dynamics of Relative Prices on a Market 
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information for all important economic indicators can be obtained on a quarterly basis. 
This information influences the behavior of economic agents.
Scenario 1 illustrates the condition of a not well-tuned market. From the perspective of 
prices, there are two main conclusions: a) the prices rise from a mean of 61 to a mean 
of 137; b) the spread of prices is less in the final periods, which indicates that even the 
agents that do not speculate practice very high prices (see Appendix 1, Figure 1).
From the perspective of the population of economic agents, the percentage of non-
speculative agents varies following a multiple v shape for some periods, due to the 
type of regulations on the market (which becomes active randomly). The lack of 
consistent regulation and the high incentives to speculate affects the non-speculative 
agents, their percentage drops to almost zero (see Appendix 1, Figure 2). 
Scenario 2 illustrates the case where we have an efficient market mechanism. The 
prices stabilize in 16 periods to a mean value of 61.6 (see Appendix 1, Figure 3). Even
if we do not have regulations in place, the effect of market mechanism stabilizes the 
price. There is a Marshall type of lag (the supply side reacts to changes in the 
economy slower than the demand) between demand and supply, and the market does 
not adjust instantaneously to different shocks, but the key idea is that the market 
forces counteract the tendency to speculate and we end up having equilibrium.
Scenario 3 illustrates the case where we do not have an efficient market mechanism, 
but we have efficient regulations in place. From the perspective of the population of 
economic agents, this regulation generates more pronounced multiple v shapes in the 
evolution of the cooperative agents than in the case of scenario 1 (see Appendix, 1 
Figure 5).  The explanation is that we have a higher number of times when the 
institutions intervene and regulate the market. The lack of specific market incentives 
not to speculate generates the return to a high number of speculative agents, until the 
moment of another intervention. From the perspective of prices, the key comparison is 
with the first scenario. What are the effects of efficient regulations? The mean of the 
prices drops to 117, as compared to 137, and the spread is similar to the first scenario 
(see Appendix 1, Figure 4).  The drop is not significant if we think that the mean price 
in Scenario 2 is 61.6. The key idea behind the results is the impact of the high level of 
prices. When the speculative actors generate high prices on the market, even if a drop 
in the number of non-speculative actors occurs, for some period, a drop in prices is 
not recorded, due to the fact that the non-speculative actors look at the average price 
on the market, which was affected by speculation. Thus, the effects of speculation on 
prices do not die out with the decrease in the number of speculators.
Scenario 4 illustrates the case where we have efficient regulations and efficient 
market mechanisms in place. The main difference in comparison with Scenario 2 is 
the higher number of cooperative agents as in the case of Scenario 4. The key point is 
to see if this high number of non-speculative agents makes a key difference. The 
mean of prices is 63.3, in the vicinity of the one obtained in Scenario 2 (see Appendix 
1, Figure 6). The type of speculative or non-speculative agent is chosen using a 
random function to select the position from the population of economic actors.  Even if 
the probability to select a cooperative agent is higher in Scenario 2 as compared to 
Scenario 4, for the first 10-15 periods the distribution is comparable.  Moreover, we 
have a sensibility to initial conditions. It is possible to select a speculative agent in the Institute of Economic Forecasting
Romanian Journal of Economic Forecasting – 1/2011 80
first periods in Scenario 4 and a non-speculative agent in Scenario 2. This leads to an 
increase in the mean of prices, in the first 10 periods, in Scenario 4, a mean that is 
higher than in Scenario 2. This affects the cooperative agents, which face a higher 
mean on the market. The main idea is that a shock that affects the mean of prices has 
irreversible effects on the market, which will converge to a higher equilibrium.
Scenario 5 illustrates the case where we have efficient regulation and incentives not to 
speculate, but we do not have an efficient market. From the perspective of the 
population of economic agents (see Appendix 1, Figure 8), one may see the impact 
that the changes in incentives has on the volatility of the population of economic 
agents. The incentives keep the number of cooperative agents high. Approaching the 
end of the periods, the state intervenes with a higher frequency, making the number of 
speculative agent lower, but once the intervention stops the number of speculative 
agents rise to their natural level, defined by the incentives to speculate or not to 
speculate (see Appendix 1, Figure 9). The mean of prices rise to 96.6 at the end of the 
simulation. The benchmark scenario is Scenario 3, where we have only efficient 
regulations and the mean of prices is 117. It is visible that the decentralized 
conditions, namely incentives on the market not to speculate, tend to have a higher 
impact on the level of prices. In this case, the incentive not to speculate that are 
characteristic to the market have a higher impact than the regulations of the market.
Scenario 6 illustrates the case of an inefficient market: lack of efficient regulations and 
dominance of speculators. The only difference from Scenario 1 is the intervention of 
the state in the market supply side. The state has a price in the vicinity of the lowest 
price on the market. This leads to a mean of 48, lower than in the case of efficient 
market regulations with a mean of 63.3 (see Appendix 1, Figure 10). This shows that 
the intervention of the state produces a lower mean price and that there is the 
possibility for this state intervention on the market to lead to a price that does not 
reflect the interplay of demand and supply on a free market. 
Scenario 7 illustrates the case when we have efficient regulations on the market and 
incentives not to speculate. The main difference from Scenario 5 is that the market 
mechanism is replaced by the intervention of the state in the market supply side. We 
obtain in this case a mean of 47, just bellow the value obtained in Scenario 5 (see 
Appendix 1, Figure 11). In respect to the results, the main difference in comparison 
with Scenario 5 is the much higher number of non-speculative actors on the market. 
We want to see if the presence of a high number of non-speculators will push the 
price even lower and by how much.  The results indicate that the mean price is almost 
unchanged. The main factor remains the intervention of the state on the supply side 
which acts as an anchor. 
Conclusions
In the simulation we analyzed: i) the impact of market regulations on prices; ii) the 
impact of the maturity of the market on prices; iii) the impact of the intervention of the 
state on the market supply side on prices; iv) the impact of the modifications of the 
incentives to speculate and not to speculate on prices. The synthesis of the 
simulations results is presented in Table 3. Analyzing the Dynamics of Relative Prices on a Market 
Romanian Journal of Economic Forecasting – 1/2011  81
Table 3
Synthetic presentation of the results of the scenarios 
  S1  S2 S3  S4  S5 S6 S7 
Mean level of prices at 
the end of simulation
137 61.6  117  63.3  96.6  48 47 
Existence of market 
equilibrium
no yes  No  yes  no  yes  yes 
Percent of cooperative 
agents
low  low high  high  high low high 
Degree of volatility in 
the population of 
economic agents
medium medium high high low medium low 
The main findings of the simulation are: 
  i) The presence of speculators leaves long lasting effects, which do not die 
out with the decrease in the number of speculators. The non-speculative behavior 
does not generate high prices on the market, but once these prices are formed it 
sustains the high level of prices.
  ii) In the presence of high speculations, the intervention of the state can act as 
an anchor to the market helping to lower the prices. There are situations when the 
adjusting mechanisms of the market work with a considerable lag, due not only to the 
imperfection of the market, but also to another mechanism. The non-speculative 
behavior of the market does not generate a higher level of prices, but by itself helps 
maintain it and acts as a brake to a market that tries to move to lower prices. In this 
case, it is the market who maintains a sub-optimal situation and the intervention of the 
state ensures a speedy adjustment. This intervention also leads to a price that doesn’t 
reflect the interplay of demand and supply on a free market. This suggests that once 
the adjustment has been made the state should retry from the market. 
  iii) The market forces have a more lasting effect than the state regulations 
mechanisms. The market regulations act via a feed-back loop mechanisms at best, 
thus with a lag. Self-regulation of the market via the modification of the benefits of the 
non-speculators in comparison with the speculators is much more efficient, once we 
have an efficient market and an efficient level of prices (by efficient we mean a level 
that allows the economic system to be in a stable state). The model indicates that a 
lack of incentives generates volatility to the market, because when not observed the 
economic agents will always try to maximize what they perceive as their best interest.
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Appendix 1 
Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
Evolution of the number of cooperative agents in the population - 
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Figure 4 
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Figure 5 
Evolution of the number of cooperative agents in the population - 
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Figure 7 
Evolution of the number of cooperative agents in the population - 










































First cluster of prices second cluster of prices Third cluster of prices
Figure 9 
Evolution of the number of cooperative agents in the population - 
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Figure 10 
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Figure 11 
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